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Abstract
This paper examines who is likely to gain and who is likely to lose under
a universal voucher program. Following Epple and Romano (1998, 2003), and
Nechyba (2000, 2003a), we focus on the idea that gains and losses under a universal voucher depend on two effects: changes in peer group composition and
changes in housing values. We show that the direction and magnitude of each
of these effects hinges critically on market structure, i.e., the amount of school
choice that already exists in the public sector. In markets with little or no Tiebout
choice, potential changes in peer group composition create an incentive for highsocioeconomic (SES) households to vote for the voucher and for low-SES households to vote against voucher. In contrast, in markets with significant Tiebout
choice, potential changes in housing values create an incentive for high-SES households to vote against the voucher and for low-SES households to vote for the
voucher. Using data on vote outcomes from California’s 2000 voucher initiative,
we find evidence consistent with those predictions.
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I.

Introduction
School vouchers are one of the most widely-discussed proposals to reform public education.

Despite that fact, no state has yet adopted a comprehensive voucher program. Colorado, California, and
Washington have all placed comprehensive voucher initiatives on their statewide ballots, but none of
those initiatives received enough popular support to pass. Furthermore, while several cities and states are
currently experimenting with limited voucher programs, all of those programs are small in scale and/or
targeted to specific student populations, making it difficult to extrapolate their results to a comprehensive
voucher program.1 Such a policy would fundamentally change the institutional structure of school
finance and could impact household decisions in ways that limited, targeted programs would not.
The fact that no state has yet approved a comprehensive voucher program leaves open many
questions about what the actual effects of such a program might be. Some contend that vouchers will lead
to higher-quality education for all students while others have focused on the distributional effects,
pointing out that wide-scale voucher policies will have winners and losers. In particular, there is a
growing theoretical literature that explores who is likely to gain and who is likely to lose with the
introduction of a universal voucher (e.g., Nechyba, 2000, 2003a; Epple and Romano, 1998, 2003). By
using general equilibrium models, these papers emphasize that the winners and losers under
comprehensive vouchers will depend on how households sort themselves across schools and
neighborhoods.
In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework that synthesizes the previous theoretical
literature to highlight the gains and losses of introducing a universal voucher. We build primarily on the
work of Epple and Romano, who focus on the ‘cream-skimming’ aspects of increased stratification by
student characteristics, and on the work of Nechyba, who also draws attention to the complications that
arise from the interaction of schooling and housing markets. Our framework thus focuses on the idea that
gains and losses under a universal voucher depend on two effects: changes in peer group composition and
changes in housing values. We show that the direction and magnitude of each of these effects hinges
critically on market structure, i.e., the amount of school choice that already exists in the public sector.
Specifically, in markets with little or no Tiebout choice, potential changes in peer group composition
create an incentive for high-socioeconomic (SES) households to vote in favor of the voucher and for lowSES households to vote against the voucher. In contrast, in markets with significant Tiebout choice,
potential changes in housing values create an incentive for high-SES households to vote against the
voucher and for low-SES households to vote in favor of the voucher.

1

Milwaukee, Cleveland and the District of Columbia operate limited voucher programs while Florida and Colorado
have enacted legislation that offers vouchers to students attending low-performing schools.
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Using data on vote outcomes from California’s 2000 voucher initiative, we find evidence that is
consistent with those predictions. Specifically, our results indicate that in low-choice markets, high-SES
households are significantly more likely to support the voucher initiative than low-SES households. In
contrast, in high-choice markets, high-SES households are significantly less likely to support the voucher
initiative than low-SES households. These results complement and tie together the findings of several
recent studies that examine the impact of expanded school choice. For example, Figlio and Stone (2001)
find that high-income, highly-educated and white households are significantly more likely to send their
children to private school if they reside in a low-choice market. This is consistent with our finding that
high-SES households are significantly more likely to support the voucher if they live in a low-choice
market. Similarly, Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) and Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2001), find that
homeowners are significantly less likely to support school vouchers if they live in a good school district, a
finding they attribute to a desire among homeowners to protect their property values. Our finding that in
high-choice markets, high-SES households are significantly less likely to support school vouchers than
low-SES households, leads us to a similar conclusion.
II.

Conceptual Framework
In November 2000, Californians voted on Proposition 38, a statewide ballot initiative that would

have provided families with a scholarship for every child enrolled in a private school. The scholarship
would have been the greatest of three amounts: $4,000, half the national average of public school
spending per pupil, or half California’s public school spending per pupil. The initiative placed few
conditions on scholarship-redeeming schools and prohibited the state from placing additional conditions
on these schools in the future. Because the scholarship would have been made available to all students,
including those already enrolled in private schools, Proposition 38 would have created the first universal
voucher system in the United States.
In this section we synthesize the work of Epple and Romano (1998, 2003) and Nechyba (1997,
2000) to illustrate who was likely to gain and who was likely to lose if Proposition 38 passed. Consider
an educational market with J equally-sized school districts and N households, with N >> J . Each
household has one child that attends the local public schools and there is one school per district.
Household i' s exogenous income is denoted y i , and no two households have the same income. Housing
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Figure 1: Allocations of Households Across School Districts by Household Income
Deviations from mean in school quality,
average ability, and house price
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within the educational market is assumed to be homogeneous and each household purchases a house in
one of the J districts for a rental price of p j .2 Households derive utility from the perceived quality of the
local public school their child attends and from a composite commodity. Perceived school quality, in
turn, depends solely on the mean income of households within a district such that q j = y j , where q j is
perceived school quality in district j and y j is the average income of households in district j .3
Following Nechyba (1997, 2000) and Epple and Romano (2003), among others, households
choose the school district that maximizes their utility, U ( y ij − p j , y j ) treating the location decisions of
other households as fixed. Market equilibrium is then defined as a set of housing prices and an allocation
of households to school districts such that all housing markets clear. As demonstrated by Epple and
Romano (2003), equilibrium is characterized by income, school quality and housing price stratification
2

We assume all housing within a market is homogeneous purely for simplicity. Nechyba (2000) analyzes the more
realistic case, in which the housing stock is heterogeneous, and reaches essentially the same conclusions that we do.
3
Epple and Romano (2003) and Nechyba (2000, 2003a) assume that school quality depends on both the mean
ability of a child’s peer group (which is assumed to be an increasing function of parental income) and on per-pupil
expenditures within a district. However, due to court-ordered reforms and Proposition 13, local school districts in
California have almost no control over local spending levels and there is very little variation across districts in
spending per pupil. As a result, we abstract from the role spending per pupil plays in determining local school
quality.
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with the highest-income families living in the district of highest quality (the district with the highestquality peer group) and the highest housing prices, and the lowest-income families living in the district of
lowest quality and the lowest housing prices. Thus, school districts are perfectly stratified in terms of
school quality, housing prices and income.
Figure 1 illustrates equilibrium allocations for cases where the market consists of one, two, and
four districts. The horizontal axis measures household income while the vertical axis shows deviations
from market averages in school quality (peer quality) and housing prices. The solid horizontal line
illustrates the case when one district comprises the entire market ( J = 1) . In that case, all households
necessarily attend the same school and hence there is no variation in school quality (peer quality) or
housing prices in the market. As the number of districts increases, income stratification increases, as does
the variation (spread) in school quality and housing prices.
The stratification pattern depicted in Figure 1 is supported by a number of recent studies. For
example, Epple and Romano (2003) find that even in California, where spending per pupil has been
essentially equalized, there is significant stratification by income across school districts. Urquiola (2005)
reaches a similar conclusion. Based on a sample of 291 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, he finds that
increases in the number of districts within an MSA leads to greater parental education and racial
stratification. Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that school quality is capitalized into housing
values, supporting the prediction that housing value differentials serve to support the observed income
stratification patterns across schools and school districts.4
Introduction of Vouchers
Now consider the introduction of private school vouchers that give rise to private schools in an
educational market. We assume the voucher induces mainly middle- and high-income households to opt
out of the public school system. This assumption is supported by Lankford and Wykoff (2002) who use
data from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey to estimate a model of public/private school
choice and then simulate the effect of private school vouchers. Their simulations suggest that, relative to
students that remain in the public sector, students that move to the private sector tend to come from
families with substantially higher incomes and from families that are much more likely to be white and
college-educated. Similarly, Hsieh and Urquiola (forthcoming) examine the impact of a nationwide
private school voucher program introduced in Chile in 1981. Their results suggest that the main effect of
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Recent studies include Black (1999), Clapp, Nanda and Ross (2005), Downes and Zabel (2002), and Bogart and
Cromwell (2000).
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unrestricted school choice was a movement of students from high- and middle-income households to the
private sector.5
As demonstrated by Nechyba (2000, 2003a), in a multi-district market, vouchers have two
different effects on the welfare of households. First, most households will experience some change in
school quality. In the absence of any productivity effects, these changes in school quality will arise from
changes in the quality of the peer group to which each household’s child is exposed. Second, vouchers
create incentives for high-income households who take up the voucher to move to poorer districts to take
advantage of lower housing prices. As a result, housing values in low-income districts will rise while
housing values in high-income districts will fall. Thus, households will experience capital gains or losses
depending on whether they initially reside in a high- or low-income school district.6 For both these peer
group and housing effects, the amount of Tiebout choice that already exists in the market will affect the
magnitude of the changes when a voucher is adopted. In what follows we examine how these two
separate effects of vouchers influence the welfare of high-income and low-income households conditional
on whether they initially live in a low-choice or high-choice education market.
Consider first households in a low-choice market. Households with relatively high income
clearly have more to gain from the introduction of a voucher than do households with relatively low
income. To demonstrate that point, consider how the introduction of a voucher differentially affects the
welfare of households with income of yH or higher, and households with income of yL or lower, when
they live in a market with just one district. As Figure 1 illustrates, because high-income households in
this market are initially restricted to a lower-quality peer group than they would face in other markets,
they have much to gain in terms of peer quality (school quality) by opting out of the public school system.
In contrast, low-income households in the market with one district have much to lose in terms of peer
quality. These households are initially exposed to a higher-quality peer group but peer quality will fall as
higher-income households use the voucher to move their children to the private sector. Furthermore,
since there are no housing price differentials in the market with one district, neither high-income nor lowincome households experience any change in housing values when the voucher is introduced.
Now consider how the introduction of a voucher differentially affects the welfare of these
households when they live in the market with four districts (i.e. a high-choice market). High-income
households in this market clearly have more to lose from the introduction of a voucher. To illustrate that
5

Nechyba (2003a, 2003b, 2003c), who uses a computable general equilibrium model to examine the effects of
introducing vouchers into a multidistrict public school system, reaches a similar conclusion. His simulations suggest
that households that use vouchers are disproportionately drawn from the high end of the income distribution.
Ferreyra (2003) reaches a similar conclusion using a CGE model similar to that of Nechyba.
6
Reback (2005), who analyzes the effect of a statewide inter-district open enrollment program in Minnesota, finds
evidence in favor of that hypothesis. Specifically, his results suggest that inter-district open enrollment led to a
substantial decline in the housing price premium associated with living in a good school district.
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point, note that in terms of peer quality, high-income households are unlikely to gain much by opting out
of the public sector since that they have already sorted themselves into a relatively homogeneous school
district. However, these same high-income households stand to incur significant capital losses if the
voucher is implemented due to changes in housing values. In contrast, low-income households in the
market with four jurisdictions stand to incur significant capital gains if the voucher is implemented and
are unlikely to lose much in terms of peer quality since they are already exposed to a relatively lowquality peer group.
To summarize, in low-choice markets, changes in peer quality create an incentive for highincome households to vote for the voucher and for low-income households to vote against the voucher.
In contrast, in high-choice markets, changes in housing values create an incentive for high-income
households to vote against the voucher and for low-income households to vote for the voucher. Thus, in
low-choice markets, support for the voucher should increase with household income, while in high-choice
markets, support for the voucher should decrease with income.
In deriving the predictions discussed above we have made a number of simplifying assumptions,
the most important of which is that households differ only along a single dimension, namely income.
That assumption allowed us to clearly illustrate the stratification pattern that emerges as the number of
school districts within an educational market increases. However, it also led us to restrict our attention to
the case where willingness to pay for school quality depends solely on household income and where
perceived school quality depends solely on the mean income of households within a district. Of course,
willingness to pay and perceived school quality most likely depend on several factors other than income.
For example, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003) develop and estimate an equilibrium model of
residential sorting in which households have preferences defined over school quality and the sociodemographic characteristics of their neighbors. Their results suggest that heterogeneous preferences for
school quality and neighbors leads to substantial stratification along racial and socioeconomic lines, with
white, highly-educated, and high-income households clustering in neighborhoods that contain the highestquality schools. Similarly, Brasington and Haurin (2005) find that households appear to use easily
observable characteristics, such as parental education and race, when comparing public school quality
among school districts. Their results suggest that perceived school quality is higher in districts that
contain more highly-educated households and lower in districts that contain higher concentrations of
minority students.
Several recent studies have also developed residential sorting models where households differ
along several dimensions, such as income and preferences (e.g. Epple and Platt, 1998; Epple and Sieg,
1999; Epple, Romer and Sieg, 2001; Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan, 2003, 2005). In contrast to the
perfect income stratification result depicted in Figure 1, these models predict that in equilibrium,

6

households will be stratified both in terms of income and other factors that determine willingness to pay
for school quality. Since these models still predict that households will be stratified by income, they do
not alter our predictions concerning the relationship between income and support for school vouchers in
high- and low-choice markets. However, these models, combined with the empirical evidence on
residential sorting discussed above, suggest that support for school vouchers in high- and low-choice
markets may also vary systematically with educational attainment and race. In particular, if in addition to
income, parental education and race are important determinants both of willingness to pay for school
quality and of perceived school quality, the voting pattern of highly-educated and white households
should be similar to that of high-income households. That is, our predictions regarding the relationship
between income and support for vouchers in high- and low-choice markets should also hold for parental
education and race. We examine that possibility in the empirical work that follows.
Our conceptual framework also assumes that each school district contains just one school. As a
result, we have implicitly assumed that households exercise Tiebout choice solely by choosing among
school districts in an educational market. However, as pointed out by Epple and Romano (2003),
households may also exercise choice by choosing among neighborhood schools within districts. That is,
the degree of choice within districts may be just as important as the degree of choice across districts. We
examine that possibility in Section V. We have also assumed that prior to the introduction of school
vouchers all school-age children attend public schools, an assumption that is clearly unrealistic. Nechyba
(2003a, 2003c) analyzes the more realistic case, in which some households send their children to private
schools prior to the introduction of school vouchers, but reaches essentially the same conclusions as we
do about the impact of school vouchers on peer quality and housing values. Nevertheless, recall that
California’s 2000 voucher initiative would have made vouchers available to all families, including those
with children currently enrolled in private school. Obviously, families with children currently enrolled in
private school stood to benefit from the voucher. To account for that fact, we explicitly control for
private school attendance in the empirical work that follows.
Our conceptual framework also ignores several additional issues that may have influenced voting
behavior on Proposition 38. One such issue is the net fiscal impact of the voucher, a question that was
likely on the minds of many taxpayers. Because Proposition 38 would have provided existing private
school students with a scholarship, the state would absorb the direct expense of those scholarships.
According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the cost of providing existing private school students with
scholarships would have been approximately $3.3 billion. On the other hand, the state would save money
on each student transferring from public to private school, because the voucher was to be less than the
average expenditure per pupil in public school. The net effect on the state budget would depend on the
number of students who would transfer. According to the Legislative Analyst's Office, if only 5 percent
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of students were to transfer, the annual cost to the state would be approximately $2 billion. In contrast, if
15 percent of students were to transfer, the state would realize an annual savings of $700 million, and if
25 percent of students were to transfer, the state would realize an annual savings of $3.4 billion.
A related concern involves how the voucher might affect public school spending. On the one
hand, because public school spending in California is essentially state-financed, it is unlikely that the
voucher would lead to a dramatic change in the distribution of resources across districts. On the other
hand, because the voucher would cause fewer families to enroll their children in public school, it could
erode political support for school spending and thus cause a general decline in spending per pupil.7 That
fact may have influenced voter behavior. Note, however, that our concern is not with the overall level of
support for Proposition 38, but rather with how support for the initiative varies with the degree of Tiebout
choice within educational markets. As long as voter concern about the effect of vouchers on public
school spending does not vary systematically across markets, that concern is unlikely to affect our results.
III.

Data
Testing the predictions derived in the previous section requires data on vote outcomes for the

voucher initiative, the characteristics of voters, and the degree of Tiebout choice within educational
markets. While we do not have data on individual voting behavior, we do have block group-level data on
the fraction of voters that supported the initiative and their characteristics. Block group-level data on vote
outcomes for Proposition 38 were obtained from the Statewide Database, maintained by the Institute of
Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. The database contains aggregate vote
outcomes and voter registration information, for all statewide primary and general elections held in
California since 1990.8
We use the December 2000 definitions of metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas,
developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to define educational markets. Metropolitan
areas are defined as urbanized areas with a population of at least 50,000, while micropolitan areas are
defined as urbanized areas with a population of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000. Both metropolitan
and micropolitan areas are defined in terms of counties and include both the county containing the central
core of the urbanized area and adjacent counties that have a high degree of economic integration as
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Note, however, that the voucher would also decrease the tax-price for public school spending faced by California
taxpayers, since it would reduce the number of students in public school. Thus, whether the voucher would cause
spending per pupil to rise or fall depends critically on which of these two effects dominates.
8
The primary unit of analysis in the Statewide Database is the census block. However, the smallest Census-defined
unit for which data on demographic characteristics are available is the block group. Consequently, we aggregated
the vote outcome and voter registration data to the block group level to make it consistent with the demographic data
used in our analysis. Detailed information on how the Statewide Database is constructed can be found at:
http://swdb.berkeley.edu.
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measured through commuting patterns. Of the 58 counties in California, 46 are located in one of the 37
metropolitan or micropolitan areas within the state. 9 We treat each of the 12 counties in California that
are not part of a metropolitan or micropolitan area as separate educational markets.
Following Hoxby (2000) and others, we use a Herfindahl-style index, based on school district
enrollment shares, to measure the degree of Tiebout choice within an educational market. Specifically,
J

the choice index for market k is: C k = 1 − ∑ e jk 2 , where e jk is total K-8 enrollment in district j in metro
j =1

area k as a share of total K-8 metropolitan enrollment. The choice index ranges in value from zero to one
with a value of zero indicating that there is only one district in the metro area and a value of one
indicating that there are many small districts within the metro area. Thus, larger values of C k are
associated with a greater degree of Tiebout choice. Among the 49 educational markets in our sample, the
average value of the choice index is 0.69 with a standard deviation of 0.30. Six markets in our sample
have a choice index equal to zero (i.e. contain just one district) and the inter-quartile range of the choice
index is 0.56 to 0.88.
To ensure that our choice index is not picking up other market-specific factors that affect vote
outcomes on the voucher initiative, we include six additional market-level variables in our analysis.
Those variables are: the log of metro area population, the log of mean household income in the metro
area, the fraction of white households, the fraction of the population age 25 or older with a college degree,
an index of racial heterogeneity, and an index of educational heterogeneity. Following Urquiola (2005),
R

the racial heterogeneity index we employ is: H k = 1 − ∑ S rk 2 , where S rk is racial group r’s share of the
r =1

population in metro area k. Greater values of this index are associated with greater racial heterogeneity.
We use a similar index to measure educational heterogeneity.10 All six of these variables were
constructed using county-level data from the 2000 Census aggregated to the metro area.
We use voter registration data from the Statewide Database and data from the 2000 Census to
construct variables that describe the characteristics of voters within block groups. The first variable is the
fraction of voters within a block group that are registered Republicans. We include this variable to

9

Two areas in California contain metropolitan subdivisions (MD’s) that correspond to the old definition of Primary
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA’s). We define these metropolitan subdivisions as separate educational
markets. Specifically, the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana area is separated into the Los-Angeles-Long BeachGlendale MD (Los Angeles County) and the Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine MD (Orange County). Similarly, the San
Francisco-Oakland-Fremont area is separated into the San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City MD (Marin, San
Francisco, and San Mateo Counties) and the Oakland-Fremont-Hayward MD (Alameda and Contra Costa Counties).
10
Specifically, following Hoxby (2000), our index of educational heterogeneity is constructed upon shares of the
population that belong to four educational attainment groups: less than high school, high-school graduate, some
college, and four years of college or more.
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control for the fact that school vouchers are a mainstay of conservative political ideology. The second
variable is the fraction of K-12 students in a block group that are enrolled in private school. We include
this variable to account for the fact that families with children in private school would have directly
benefited from the voucher. The third variable is the fraction of employed persons sixteen years or older
who work in educational services, which we take to be a proxy for the fraction of residents who are public
school teachers. We include this variable because public school teachers and teacher unions are often
vocal opponents of the voucher. The remaining variables are: mean household income, the fraction of
the population age 25 or older with a college degree or higher, the fraction of households that are white,
the fraction of households that are homeowners, and the fraction of households with school-age children.
We excluded a number of observations from our analysis. Specifically, in 2000, California had
22,133 block groups. We excluded 80 of those block groups due to missing data on vote outcomes for
Proposition 38. We excluded an additional 111 block groups due to missing Census data on household
income and educational attainment. As a result of those exclusions, our final data set contains 21,942
block groups.
Table 1 provides summary statistics at the metropolitan and block group levels. Columns 1 and 2
report the means and standard deviations of variables used in our analysis while column 3 reports the
correlation between the choice index and all other variables. Note that for the block group characteristics,
the correlations reported in column 3 represent the correlation between the choice index and the
metropolitan averages of the block group-level variables. As column 3 reveals, high-choice markets tend
to be larger, have lower percentages of white households, and have higher degrees of racial and
educational heterogeneity.

10

Table 1
Summary Statistics
Mean
Variable
(1)
Metro Area Characteristics
Choice Index
Population (thousands)
Mean Household Income
Fraction of White Households
Fraction College Educated
Index of Racial Heterogeneity
Index of Educational Heterogeneity
Block Group Characteristics
Fraction Voting Yes
Fraction Registered Republicans
Fraction Enrolled in Private School
Fraction Homeowners
Fraction Employed in Education
Fraction H.H's with School-Age Children
Fraction Households White
Fraction College Educated
Mean Household Income

IV.

Standard
Deviation
(2)

MSA-Level Correlation
with Choice
(3)

0.69
691
54,256
0.63
0.28
0.47
0.72

N = 49
0.30
1,528
13,480
0.15
0.29
0.16
0.01

1.00
0.26
0.23
-0.42
0.07
0.43
0.25

0.29
0.33
0.12
0.59
0.09
0.38
0.56
0.32
65,192

N = 21,942
0.07
0.15
0.15
0.27
0.06
0.16
0.29
0.21
36,944

-0.28
-0.20
0.12
-0.31
-0.01
0.44
-0.41
0.17
0.27

Empirical Specification
Using the data described above, we specify the following equation for the fraction of yes votes in

a block group:

yeslk = β 1 Alk + β 2 Alk ⋅ C k + X lk γ + Z k δ + ε lk ,

(1)

where yeslk is the logistic transformation of the fraction of yes votes on the voucher initiative for voters
in block group l and metro area k, Alk is either an individual block group attribute (the log of mean
household income, fraction college, or fraction white) or a vector of attributes that determine how
households sort themselves across districts, C k is a Herfindahl index of school district choice in metro

11

area k, X lk is a set of control variables describing the characteristics of voters in block group l , Z k is a
set of metro area-specific variables, including C k , and ε lk is a random disturbance term.
The parameters of key interest are those on the sorting attributes, Alk , and the interaction term,

Alk ⋅ C k . As noted above, we consider three block group variables that are likely to affect household
sorting in an educational market, namely the log of mean household income, the fraction of residents with
a college education and the fraction of households that are white. All three of these variables are defined
relative to their metro area counterparts to account for the fact that Tiebout choice affects sorting patterns
within metro areas. For example, we measure income as the log of mean household income in a block
group over the mean household income in the metro area.
The predictions derived in the previous section suggest that as school district choice increases,
support for the voucher should decrease among high-socioeconomic status (SES) households (highincome, highly-educated, and/or white households). In terms of our empirical model, that prediction
implies that β 2 , the coefficient on Alk ⋅ C k , should be negative. Furthermore, our conceptual framework
suggests that in low-choice markets, changes in peer quality create an incentive for high-SES households
to vote in favor of the voucher and for low-SES households to vote against the voucher. In terms of our
regression model, when choice is lowest, C k is equal to zero and the interaction term drops out; thus, β 1 ,
the coefficient on Alk alone, reflects support among households in a low-choice market. Our predictions
therefore imply that β 1 should be positive. Similarly, our predictions suggest that in high-choice
markets, changes in housing values create an incentive for high-SES households to vote against the
voucher and for low-SES households to vote for the voucher. In terms of our empirical model that
prediction implies not only that β 2 should be negative but also that β 1 + β 2 < 0 . That is, if
capitalization effects matter, we should observe lower-than-average support among high-SES households
in markets with significant Tiebout choice but higher-than-average support among low-SES households
in those markets.11

11

Note that the coefficient on the interaction term, β 2 , may be determined by either changes in peer quality, or

capitalization, or both. Specifically, in the absence of capitalization effects, β 2 should still be negative since
changes in peer quality are smaller for high-SES households in markets with more choice. Thus, to identify the
presence and relative importance of capitalization effects, we must look not only at the sign of the interaction term
but the magnitude as well.
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V.

Results
Regression results are reported in Table 2. All the models we estimate are weighted by the total

number of voters in each block group. In addition, all standard errors are clustered at the metro level to
allow for within-metro area autocorrelation of the disturbance term, ε lk . Columns 1 through 3 report
results based on specifications where the district choice index is interacted with only one of the three
sorting measures (income, education or race, respectively). Column 4 reports results based on a
specification that includes interactions between the district choice index and all three sorting measures.
We first note that the coefficient estimates on our control variables are generally consistent with
our expectations. For example, our results suggest that support for the voucher is higher among families
with children enrolled in private school and among Republican households. Similarly, support for the
voucher decreases with the fraction of people employed in educational services. That finding is
consistent with the notion that public school teachers are more likely to oppose school vouchers.
Turning to the key parameters of interest, the results are qualitatively similar for all four
specifications. For example, in column 1, the estimated coefficient on income alone is positive and
statistically significant while the coefficient on the interaction term between the Herfindahl index and
income is negative and significant. Thus, consistent with our earlier predictions, our results suggest that
in markets with little or no Tiebout choice, high-income households are more supportive of the voucher
than the average household but this support decreases as we move to markets with more choice.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term is large enough that the sum of the
two coefficients is negative.12 This indicates that not only does support among high-income households
decrease with choice, but in markets with significant Tiebout choice, high-income households are actually
less supportive than the average household while low-income households are more supportive. As
columns 2 and 3 reveal, this pattern holds for education and race as well.
As noted above, column 4 presents results based on a specification where the interaction terms
between the district choice index and the three sorting measures are included simultaneously. In that
specification, only the estimated coefficient on the interaction between the fraction of white households
and district choice remains statistically significant. However, it is important to point out that these results
are difficult to interpret since income, education, and race are highly correlated. Indeed, given the strong
positive correlation among all three sorting measures, it is not too surprising that very few of the
estimated coefficients of interest remain statistically significant.
In Table 3, we explore the robustness of our results to a number of specification choices.
Although all the models in Table 2 include controls for metro-area variables, it is possible that the choice
12

In all cases, a Wald test that the coefficients on the sorting variable and the interaction term sum to zero can be
rejected at the five percent level.

13

Table 2
Coefficient Estimates
Dependent Variable: log[(fraction ‘yes’ on Prop. 38)/(1-fraction ‘yes’ on Prop. 38)]

Fraction Republican
Fraction Private School
Fraction Homeowners
Fraction Emp. Education
Fraction H.H's with Children
Fraction White
Fraction College
Income
Income*Choice
College*Choice
White*Choice

Choice
log MSA population
MSA Race Index
MSA Education Index
log MSA Income
MSA Fraction College
MSA Fraction White
Constant

Income
(1)

Education
(2)

Race
(3)

All Interactions
(4)

2.135***
(0.091)
0.233***
(0.036)
-0.160***
(0.039)
-0.598***
(0.068)
0.149***
(0.021)
-0.021
(0.060)
-0.120***
(0.017)
0.596***
(0.153)
-0.694***
(0.167)
…
…
…
…

2.140***
(0.090)
0.235***
(0.035)
-0.158***
(0.038)
-0.570***
(0.065)
0.143***
(0.022)
-0.028
(0.059)
0.436**
(0.172)
0.001
(0.024)
…
…
-0.648***
(0.217)
…
…

2.186***
(0.093)
0.228***
(0.034)
-0.143***
(0.036)
-0.555***
(0.069)
0.084**
(0.032)
1.158***
(0.318)
-0.129***
(0.018)
0.001
(0.023)
…
…
…
…
-1.420***
(0.388)

2.185***
(0.092)
0.229***
(0.034)
-0.144***
(0.035)
-0.549***
(0.067)
0.088**
(0.034)
1.057***
(0.346)
0.053
(0.158)
-0.097
(0.241)
0.115
(0.289)
-0.212
(0.199)
-1.302***
(0.414)

-0.116
(0.109)
0.006
(0.018)
0.158
(0.344)
0.767
(1.090)
-0.104
(0.219)
-0.033
(0.527)
0.225
(0.292)
-1.045
(1.953)

0.572**
(0.226)
0.008
(0.018)
0.178
(0.344)
0.612
(1.095)
-0.089
(0.219)
-0.092
(0.525)
0.266
(0.297)
-1.736
(1.982)

1.344***
(0.413)
0.005
(0.018)
0.179
(0.340)
0.727
(1.082)
-0.097
(0.217)
-0.036
(0.516)
0.208
(0.292)
-2.289
(1.973)

1.446**
(0.557)
0.006
(0.018)
0.182
(0.340)
0.677
(1.096)
-0.093
(0.217)
-0.053
(0.523)
0.221
(0.295)
-2.105
(2.023)

Observations
21942
21942
21942
21942
R-squared
0.69
0.69
0.70
0.70
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, (2) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
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Table 3
Coefficient Estimates for Alternative Model Specifications
Dependent Variable: log[(fraction ‘yes’ on Prop. 38)/(1-fraction ‘yes’ on Prop. 38)]
Baseline: Block
Group and Market
Controls
(1)

Block Group
Controls

Market Fixed
Effects

Excluding 1District Markets

Excluding NonMSA's

2SLS

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.596***
(0.153)
-0.694***
(0.167)
0.69

0.619***
(0.153)
-0.728***
(0.168)
0.69

0.557***
(0.146)
-0.662***
(0.161)
0.72

0.671***
(0.178)
-0.781***
(0.192)
0.69

0.647***
(0.172)
-0.752***
(0.187)
0.69

0.679***
(0.182)
-0.791***
(0.197)
0.69

R-squared

0.436**
(0.172)
-0.648***
(0.217)
0.69

0.449**
(0.174)
-0.661***
(0.218)
0.69

0.416**
(0.167)
-0.613***
(0.211)
0.72

0.491**
(0.191)
-0.712***
(0.239)
0.70

0.480**
(0.186)
-0.698***
(0.234)
0.70

0.501**
(0.212)
-0.723**
(0.268)
0.70

Fraction White

1.158***

1.183***

1.129***

1.166***

1.164***

1.180***

(0.318)

(0.319)

(0.320)

(0.321)

(0.321)

(0.352)

Income
Income*Choice
R-squared
Fraction College
College*Choice

White*Choice

-1.420***
-1.462***
-1.369***
-1.430***
-1.427***
-1.447***
(0.388)
(0.389)
(0.394)
(0.392)
(0.392)
(0.423)
R-squared
0.70
0.70
0.73
0.70
0.70
0.70
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, (2) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, (3) Models 1, 4,
5 and 6 include all block group and market-level control variables listed in Table 2.

index is still picking up some other market characteristics that could affect vote outcomes, or that our
results are sensitive to which market variables we include. We address these concerns in two ways. First,
we drop all market-level variables, leaving only block group characteristics, the choice variable and the
interaction terms. These results are reported in column 2 of Table 3 (for comparison, the baseline results
from Table 2 are repeated in column 1 of Table 3); in the interests of space, we report only the
coefficients on the sorting variables and the interaction terms.13 We also estimate an alternative
specification that replaces the market-level control variables with a set of market fixed effects; those
results are shown in column 4.14 In either case, the results are quite similar to the previous estimates.
In columns 4 and 5, we verify that our results are robust to changes in the sample. Recall that
there are six markets with only one school district (i.e., the choice index is equal to zero). To verify that
our results are not driven by these outliers, we drop these markets from the sample and re-estimate our
baseline model. We also estimate the model without the 12 counties that are outside metropolitan or
micropolitan areas. Across all models, our results are consistent; in all cases, the estimated coefficients
13

We also estimated specifications with subsets of the metro-area variables shown in Table 2. Our results do not
appear sensitive to the choice of variables. Those estimates are available upon request from the authors.
14
Note that because the fixed effects specification utilizes only within-market variation, the level effect of school
choice is not directly estimable. However, the primary relationship of interest is the effect of choice conditional on
sorting and that effect is still identified by the interaction terms between choice and the sorting variables.

15

support our predictions that among high-income, highly-educated and/or white households, support for
the voucher decreases with the degree of Tiebout choice.
Finally, it is possible that our results could also be subject to bias from omitted variables if there
is some unobserved variation in household sorting patterns that is correlated with market structure. It
would then be inappropriate to interpret our results as the causal effects of sorting. For example, voters
with a strong taste for choice in general may be more likely to support vouchers but may also have
already chosen to live in areas with more school choice available. To reduce this bias, we estimate our
models with instrumental variables.15 Following Rothstein (forthcoming), we use two instruments based
on historical patterns of district consolidation: the number of school districts in an MSA in 1945, and the
Herfindahl index for enrollment in 1945. These historical measures should identify variation in the
amount of current choice that is uncorrelated with any characteristics of the market today. The results of
the 2SLS estimation are presented in column 6 of Table 3. In addition to the choice index itself, the
interaction terms are also instrumented, using the interaction of the sorting variables and the instruments.
Compared to the OLS results, there is very little change in the coefficients on any of the interaction terms.
The fact that the estimated coefficients are fairly similar to all the other specifications gives us more
confidence that they reflect the causal effects of sorting within and across markets with varying degrees of
Tiebout choice.
Predicted Support
To see the effects of choice more clearly, Table 4 presents the predicted percentage of ‘yes’ votes
on the voucher initiative, calculated using the coefficient estimates reported in Table 2. We show
predicted support for the voucher for block groups with high, average and low values of each of our
sorting variables, in a market with no Tiebout choice (Herfindahl index equal to zero) and in a market
with significant Tiebout choice (Herfindahl index equal to one). 16 Recall that block group income,
education and race are measured relative to the market. Thus, we define “high” values of the sorting
variables as block groups at the 90th percentile of the distribution while “low” values represent block
groups at the 10th percentile of the distribution.
These predicted values highlight some important patterns. In markets with no choice, block
groups where households are high-income, highly-educated and/or white are much more supportive than
the average but this support always decreases with the amount of choice. At the same time, block groups
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Hoxby (2000) and Rothstein (forthcoming) also discuss whether choice is endogenous in models where the
dependent variable is a measure of school quality. It is less clear how choice is endogenous to voter support for
vouchers; however, the instrumental variables approach would control for such endogeneity as well.
16
All other block group and market characteristics are held constant at their sample averages.
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Table 4
Predicted Percentage of ‘Yes’ Votes on Proposition 38
Choice = 0
39.2%
29.6
22.1
41.4%
30.4
23.3
53.1%
30.2
12.6
51.1%
30.6
14.2

High Income
Average Income
Low Income
High Fraction College
Average Fraction College
Low Fraction College
High Fraction White
Average Fraction White
Low Fraction White
High Income, College, White
Average Income, College, White
Low Income, College, White

Choice = 1
27.2%
28.6
30.0
24.3%
28.8
32.6
24.4%
28.6
33.9
22.0%
28.9
36.6

where households are low-income, less-educated and/or non-white are much less supportive than the
average and this support always increases with the amount of choice. In all cases, the effect of choice is
large enough that households with higher-than-average support in the low-choice market flip to having
lower-than-average support in the high-choice market, and vice versa.
It is notable that the differences in support within the low-choice market are quite large in all
cases. High-income households are 17.1 percentage points more supportive of the voucher than lowincome households; college-educated households are 18.1 percentage points more supportive than noncollege-educated households; and white households are 40.5 percentage points more supportive than nonwhite households. This is strong evidence that in low-choice markets, concerns about peer quality have a
large effect on voting behavior.
That we find particularly high support among high-income, highly-educated and white
households in the low-choice market complements the results of Epple, Figlio and Romano (2004), as
well as Figlio and Stone, who conclude that, “…high-income students, and those students with a high
level of parental education, are more likely to enroll in the private sector as the public sector becomes
more concentrated. Therefore, private school cream skimming may be exacerbated in places with fewer
public sector options” (Figlio and Stone, 2001, p.255). Higher support for a universal voucher among
high-SES households in more concentrated markets suggests that these households are more likely to use
the voucher to opt out of the public school sector. Lower support for a universal voucher among low-SES
households in more concentrated markets suggests that these households are aware of the potential for
cream-skimming and are concerned about its consequences.
In markets with significant Tiebout choice, our results also support the hypothesis that changes in
housing values lead high-SES households to be less supportive of the voucher than the average household
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but lead low-SES households to be more supportive, though the differences in support are somewhat
smaller within the high-choice market. For example, the bottom panel of Table 4 shows that a block
group where households are high-income, highly-educated and white is 14.6 percentage points less
supportive than a block group where households are low-income, less-educated and non-white. These
results complement the findings of Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2001). Using precinct-level voting
returns from California’s 1993 voucher initiative, they found that homeowners located in school districts
with high housing price premiums were significantly less likely to support the voucher than homeowners
located in school districts with low housing price premiums. They conclude that the most plausible
explanation for their results is that homeowners located in good school districts voted against the voucher
to protect their housing values. Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) reach a similar conclusion based on their
analysis of individual voting behavior on California’s 2000 voucher initiative. Because these authors do
not examine how support for school vouchers varies with the degree of Tiebout choice, their results are
not directly comparable to ours. Nevertheless, their results are consistent with our finding that in highchoice markets, high-SES households are significantly less likely to support school vouchers than lowSES households.
It is also worthwhile to point out that the average level of support is marginally lower in highchoice markets. This is consistent with a number of studies (e.g., Rothstein, forthcoming; Urquiola, 2005;
Hoxby, 2000) that suggest that increased Tiebout choice reduces demand for private schooling by
allowing parents to more readily satisfy their preferences for schooling within the public sector. Hoxby
(2000) also suggests that metropolitan areas with more Tiebout choice may have lower rates of private
school enrollment because they have more productive public schools. That is, expanded school choice
may lead public schools to become more efficient which, in turn, reduces the attractiveness of private
school alternatives.17 Thus, productivity effects could be an alternative explanation for our finding that
support for vouchers decreases with choice at the average and among high-income households. However,
because choice is a metro area measure, productivity effects cannot explain the differences between highand low-income households within markets. Furthermore, we find that support for vouchers increases
with choice among low-income households, the opposite of what we would expect if productivity
concerns were driving our results.

17

McMillan (2004) challenges the presumption that increased school choice will necessarily lead to more productive
public schools. He demonstrates that in some circumstances, the introduction of universal vouchers may actually
lead public schools to reduce productivity.
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School-Level Sorting
Thus far, we have implicitly assumed that parents exercise Tiebout choice by choosing among
districts in a metro area. However, as we noted in Section II, parents may also exercise choice by
choosing among schools within districts. As a result, our measure of Tiebout choice, which is based on
school district enrollment shares, may understate the degree of choice available to households residing in
districts with multiple schools. To address that concern, we also estimate models in which we include a
school-level choice index based on school enrollment shares within each district.18 We interact the school
index with each of our sorting variables and add these interaction terms, as well as the school choice
index itself, to our model. The results are reported in column 2 of Table 5. For the sake of brevity, Table
5 reports only the coefficients on the sorting variables and the interaction terms for district and school
choice; however, we note that our model also includes all the block group and MSA-level variables
included in Table 2. In addition, we include the same controls at the district level as for the MSA (i.e.,
district enrollment, income, etc.).19 The coefficients of primary interest are the interaction terms between
the sorting variables and school choice. If households view within-district choice as a viable option, the
conceptual framework outlined in section II would predict that the coefficients on the interaction terms
for school choice should be negative. That is, the signs of those coefficients should be the same as the
signs on the interaction terms between the sorting variables and our district choice index. However, we
find that once we have controlled for district choice, school choice has no effect. The coefficients on the
interaction terms between the school choice index and sorting variables, though negative for income and
education, are never statistically significant.
The results reported in column 2 cast some doubt on whether households view within-district
choice as a viable option. There are several plausible explanations for that result. First, as noted by
Rothstein (forthcoming), within-district school attendance zones are subject to frequent revision, thus
limiting the ability of households to exercise Tiebout choice at the school level.20 In support of that
argument, Rothstein (forthcoming) finds that district-level measures of school choice are consistently a
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Using a district-specific choice index adds a minor complication to the analysis. Although the majority of block
groups are located completely within the boundaries of a single school district, some block groups cross district
boundaries. Since we now wish to match vote outcomes on the voucher initiative to specific school districts, these
block groups obviously present a problem. Census blocks, however, are located completely within the boundaries of
a single school district and although not all of our variables are reported at the block level, we do have vote
outcomes on Proposition 38 and the fraction of voters that were registered Republicans at the block level.
Consequently, in cases where a block group spanned more than one district, we measured vote outcomes on
Proposition 38 and the fraction of voters that were registered Republicans at the block level and assigned blockgroup level values of the other variables.
19
We also estimated all models with market fixed effects; those results are quite similar to the results reported in
Table 5 and are available upon request.
20
One common reason school districts often revise school attendance zones is to maintain appropriate racial and
ethnic balances across schools within districts.
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Table 5
School-Level Sorting
Logit Estimates

(1)

District and School
Choice
(2)

District and School
Choice Expanded
(3)

0.597***
(0.154)
-0.694***
(0.168)
…
…
…
…

0.541***
(0.139)
-0.533***
(0.117)
-0.070
(0.074)
…
…

0.571***
(0.133)
-0.454***
(0.112)
-0.200***
(0.069)
0.062***
(0.019)

0.438**
(0.174)
-0.652***
(0.220)
…
…
…
…

0.359***
(0.115)
-0.471***
(0.131)
-0.047
(0.061)
…
…

0.399***
(0.122)
-0.445***
(0.131)
-0.128**
(0.063)
0.049*
(0.026)

1.162***
(0.318)
-1.422***
(0.389)
…
…
…
…

0.763***
(0.219)
-1.116***
(0.279)
0.170
(0.125)
…
…

0.851***
(0.220)
-1.010***
(0.277)
-0.108
(0.105)
0.141***
(0.027)

District Choice

Income
Income*District Choice
Income*School Choice
Income*School Choice*Urban

College
College*District Choice
College*School Choice
College*School Choice*Urban

White
White*District Choice
White*School Choice
White*School Choice*Urban

Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, (2) * significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%, (3) all models include all block group and market-level control
variables listed in Table 2; models 2 and 3 also include district-level control variables.

stronger predictor of MSA private school enrollment rates than school-level measures of school choice.
Second, in 1993 the California State Legislature approved AB 1114, which established a mandatory
program of intra-district school choice. Starting in the 1994-95 school year, parents could choose to send
their child to any school within the boundaries of their designated school district. Thus, AB 1114 may
have significantly weakened the link between residential location and within-district school assignments.
An alternative explanation is that a Herfindahl index of school enrollment shares is a somewhat
imperfect measure of within-district choice. The school choice index is highly correlated with district
enrollment, since the number of schools within districts tends to increase proportionally with district
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enrollment. However, the majority of California’s largest districts are inner-city urban districts and the
vast majority of schools within these districts serve minority and low-income students. For example,
Fresno Unified, with an enrollment of over 79,000 students, contains 95 schools but 80% of the students
that attend those schools are nonwhite and 73% of the students are low-income students that are eligible
for free or reduced price lunch. Thus, although the school choice index takes on a high value, these
schools may actually provide very little in the way of real choice. To allow for this possibility, we
include an additional interaction term: the sorting variable-school choice index interaction is further
interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value of unity for large inner-city urban districts.21 As
shown in column 3 of Table 5, the coefficient on this additional interaction term is consistently positive
and statistically significant, indicating that high-income, highly-educated or white households in large
inner-city urban districts are more supportive of vouchers than similar households in non-urban districts.
That finding is consistent with the notion that our school-level choice index may be overstating the degree
of choice in large inner-city urban districts. Furthermore, once we account for the separate effect of
choice in large inner-city districts, the school-choice interactions have the expected negative signs and,
with the exception of race, are statistically significant, suggesting that households do sort among schools
within districts. This is consistent with the district-level results and our conceptual framework. However,
we also note that this within-district sorting only slightly diminishes the effects of sorting across districts
within metro areas. For ease of presentation, we will continue to focus on district choice for the
remainder of the paper, keeping in mind that within-district school sorting is likely to reinforce these
effects.

VI.

Peer Quality and Capitalization
Our results suggest that in markets with relatively little Tiebout choice, high-income, highly-

educated and white households are significantly more supportive of vouchers than low-income, lesseducated and non-white households. We interpret this as evidence that households are motivated by the
changes in peer quality that are likely to follow the implementation of a universal voucher. We also find
that in markets with significant Tiebout choice, high-income, highly-educated and white households are
less supportive than low-income, less-educated and non-white households. We interpret this as evidence
that voters in high-choice markets are also motivated by the effect of vouchers on housing values.
However, there is an alternative explanation for our results in the high-choice market. We have
been assuming that in markets with significant Tiebout choice, gains and losses due to peer quality are
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We define large inner-city urban districts as districts with an enrollment of 25,000 students more and a student
population that is at least 75% nonwhite. In 2000 there were 20 such districts in California, including California’s
largest school district, Los Angeles Unified.
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minimal because households have already sorted into schools that match their preferences; thus,
differences in support among high- and low-SES households in that market are motivated primarily by
housing price effects. However, while high-SES households may be satisfied with their schools, it is
quite likely that low-SES households are not. Since they are forced into schools with lower peer quality,
low-SES households may be more supportive of vouchers, not because of capitalization, but because they
would still like to leave the public sector in search of higher peer quality. If this is the case, peer effects
alone could lead to the voting patterns we observe in both the low-choice and high-choice markets.
In order to identify the presence and relative importance of capitalization effects, we turn to the
voting behavior of homeowners and renters. As discussed in Brunner and Sonstelie (2001, 2003) and
Nechyba (2003a), if voters are aware of the potential impact of vouchers on housing values, renters and
homeowners should view the benefits of a universal voucher quite differently. For example, consider
how the introduction of school vouchers differentially affects high-SES homeowners and renters in a
high-choice market. Because the voucher would reduce the housing price premium attached to living in a
high-quality school district, high-SES homeowners stand to incur significant capital losses if the voucher
is implemented. In contrast, high-SES renters incur no capital losses and may even benefit from lower
rents. Thus, if the potential impact of vouchers on housing values influences voter behavior, the voting
pattern of renters and homeowners in high-choice markets should look different. In particular, high-SES
homeowners should be less supportive of school vouchers than high-SES renters in a high-choice market.
Similarly, low-SES homeowners, who stand to incur significant capital gains if the voucher is
implemented, should be more supportive of school vouchers than low-SES renters. We refer to these
predictions as the capitalization hypothesis. On the other hand, if peer effects alone are driving the voting
patterns we observe, the voting behavior of homeowners and renters should look quite similar. That is,
there is no reason to believe that renters, of any socioeconomic status, are any more or less concerned
about peer quality than homeowners. We refer to that prediction as the peer-quality hypothesis.
To examine which of the two hypotheses better explains the voting pattern we observe, we
expanded our empirical model to include the characteristics of homeowners and renters separately.
Specifically, our expanded specification takes the following form:

y lk = β1h wlkh Alkh + β 2h wlkh Alkh ⋅ C k + wlkh X lkh γ h + β 1r wlkr Alkr + β 2r wlkr Alkr ⋅ C k
+ wlkr X lkr γ r + Z k δ + ε lk

.

In equation (2), the superscript h implies the coefficient or variable is for homeowners, while the
superscript r implies the coefficient or variable is for renters. For example, Alkh is a vector of
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(2)

homeowner-specific sorting attributes (such as the average income of homeowners and the fraction of
White homeowners) and X lkh is a set of control variables that describe other characteristics of
homeowners within a block group. The variables with an r superscript are similarly defined except they
now pertain to renters. Since the fraction of total votes cast by homeowners and renters must sum to one,
all the homeowner variables in equation (2) are multiplied by the fraction of homeowners in a block
group, wlkh , while all the renter variables are multiplied by the fraction of renters in a block group, wlkr .
Recall that in order to identify the presence and relative importance of capitalization effects one
must compare the voting behavior of homeowners and renters in high-choice markets. Thus, in terms of
our empirical model, one must compare the difference between β 1h + β 2h and β 1r + β 2r . If capitalization
effects influence voter behavior, the capitalization hypothesis predicts that high-SES homeowners should
be less supportive of school vouchers than high-SES renters in a high-choice market. That prediction
implies β 1h + β 2h < β 1r + β 2r . In contrast, the peer quality hypothesis predicts β 1h + β 2h = β 1r + β 2r .
That is, homeowners and renters in the high-choice market look quite similar.
Results based on the estimation of equation (2) are reported in Table 6. The 2000 Census
provides only a limited number of variables that can be broken down separately for homeowners and
renters. Those variables are household income, the fraction of households with school-age children and
the fraction of households that are white. For these three variables, separate parameter estimates are
reported for homeowners and renters.22 Column 1 reports results based on a specification where the
district choice index is interacted with the log of mean homeowner income and the log of mean renter
income. Similarly, column 2 reports results based on a specification where the district choice index is
interacted with the fraction of white homeowners and the fraction of white renters.
In general, the results reported in Table 6 provide mixed evidence on whether voters in highchoice markets are responding primarily to peer effects or to capitalization effects. To illustrate that
point, consider first the results reported in column 1. As noted earlier, if capitalization effects influence
voting behavior, then β 1h + β 2h < β 1r + β 2r . The point estimates reported in column 1 reveal that this is
the case for income: the sum of the homeowner coefficients on log income and the interaction of log
income with choice ( β 1h + β 2h ) is -0.307 (0.697 + -1.004), while the sum of the renter coefficients on log
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At the block group level, the 2000 Census provides information on household income and race broken down
separately for homeowners and renters. At the tract level, the 2000 Census provides information on households with
school age children. Thus, we use tract level data to construct the fraction of homeowners and renters with schoolage children. In addition, note that the 2000 Census does not provide information on educational attainment (one of
our sorting variables), broken down separately for homeowners and renters.
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Table 6
Homeowners versus Renters
Logit Estimates

Variables Interacted with Fraction of Homeowners
Constant
Fraction of Homeowner Households with Children
Fraction of Homeowners White
Income
Income*Choice
Fraction of Homeowners White*Choice
Variables Interacted with Fraction of Renters
Constant
Fraction of Renter Households with Children
Fraction of Renters White
Income
Income*Choice
Fraction of Renters White*Choice

Income
(1)

Race
(2)

-0.813
(2.010)
0.273**
(0.108)
-0.109
(0.072)
0.697**
(0.264)
-1.004***
(0.320)
…
…

-1.913
(2.002)
0.157*
(0.079)
1.026***
(0.304)
-0.185***
(0.034)
…
…
-1.351***
(0.368)

-0.969
(2.005)
0.488***
(0.098)
0.063*
(0.033)
0.506***
(0.184)
-0.683***
(0.230)
…
…

-2.086
(1.992)
0.445***
(0.106)
1.181***
(0.373)
-0.084***
(0.024)
…
…
-1.364***
(0.467)

Other Control Variables
Choice

-0.135
1.254***
(0.101)
(0.410)
Fraction Republican
2.136***
2.184***
(0.098)
(0.103)
Fraction Private School
0.220***
0.209***
(0.042)
(0.040)
Fraction Emp. Education
-0.810***
-0.779***
(0.097)
(0.096)
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, (2) ** significant at 5%, *** significant at
1%, (3) both models also include all the market-level control variables listed in Table 2.

income and the interaction of log income with choice ( β 1r + β 2r ) is only -0.177 (0.506 + -0.683).
However, based on a Wald test, the null hypothesis that β 1h + β 2h = β 1r + β 2r can only be rejected at the
15% level of significance. That is, the magnitude of difference between the homeowner and renter
coefficients is not large enough to reject the hypothesis that the voting behavior of homeowners and
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renters is quite similar. That finding is generally consistent with the peer quality hypothesis. Now
consider the results reported in column 2. In those results, the sum of the homeowner coefficients on
fraction white and the interaction of fraction white with choice ( β 1h + β 2h ) is -0.325 (1.026 + -1.351)
while the sum of the renter coefficients on fraction white and the interaction of fraction white with choice
( β 1r + β 2r ) is only -0.183 (1.181 + -1.364). Furthermore, based on a Wald test, one can now reject the
null hypothesis that β 1h + β 2h = β 1r + β 2r at the 3% level. Thus, the results reported in column 2 are
generally consistent with the capitalization hypothesis.
Households with and without children
Table 6 provides some limited evidence that capitalization effects influence voting behavior. As
an alternative method of identifying the presence of capitalization effects we turn to the voting behavior
of households with and without school-age children. If capitalization effects influence voting behavior,
one would expect the voting pattern of households with children in the high-choice market to look very
much like the voting pattern of households without children, since capital gains and losses would affect
both groups equally. On the other hand, if peer effects alone are driving voting behavior, one would
expect the voting pattern of the two groups to look very different. In particular, since households without
children have little reason to be concerned about the impact of vouchers on peer quality, there is no
reason to believe support for the voucher among households without children should vary with whether
they live in a low- or high-choice market. In contrast, support for the voucher among households with
children should depend critically on whether those households live in a high- or low-choice market.23
To test those predictions, we used data on the fraction of households with school-age children in
each block group to split our dataset into two similarly-sized samples. The first sample contains block
groups in which the fraction of households with children is greater than 0.48, the 75th percentile of
households with children in our sample. Similarly, the second sample contains the block groups in which
the fraction of households with children is less than 0.273, the 25th percentile. Thus, the first sample
corresponds to block groups with a high fraction of households with children, while the second sample
corresponds to block groups with a low fraction of households with children. We then estimated separate
regressions for each of the two samples.

23

Households without children may still be concerned about peer quality; for example, if household members have
grandchildren in public schools, are planning to have children, or are simply altruistic. However, it seems
reasonable to assume that households with school-age children are more concerned about peer quality than
households without children in school. This weaker assumption is all that is required for our identification strategy.
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Table 7
Households with and without Children
Dependent Variable: log[(fraction ‘yes’ on Prop. 38)/(1-fraction ‘yes’ on Prop. 38)]
% H.H's with Children Greater than 48%
All
Income
Education
Race
Interactions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Fraction White
Fraction College
Income
Income*Choice
College*Choice
White*Choice

Observations
R-Squared

% H.H's with Children Less than 27.3%
All
Income
Education
Race
Interactions
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

-0.048
(0.051)
-0.097***
(0.024)
1.251***
(0.362)
-1.462***
(0.427)
…
…
…
…

-0.039
(0.055)
0.571**
(0.267)
-0.013
(0.036)
…
…
-0.770**
(0.344)
…
…

1.167***
(0.420)
-0.106***
(0.028)
-0.014
(0.037)
…
…
…
…
-1.414**
(0.537)

0.891**
(0.392)
-0.345**
(0.157)
0.835***
(0.167)
-0.982***
(0.196)
0.279
(0.179)
-1.101**
(0.490)

-0.011
(0.056)
-0.128***
(0.023)
0.041
(0.155)
-0.031
(0.168)
…
…
…
…

-0.018
(0.055)
0.197*
(0.113)
0.017
(0.037)
…
…
-0.381**
(0.149)
…
…

0.921***
(0.197)
-0.132***
(0.021)
0.017
(0.035)
…
…
…
…
-1.133***
(0.264)

0.908***
(0.234)
0.178
(0.190)
-0.398
(0.302)
0.486
(0.352)
-0.363
(0.236)
-1.118***
(0.299)

5485
0.66

5485
0.66

5485
0.66

5485
0.67

5513
0.75

5513
0.75

5513
0.76

5513
0.76

Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, (2) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, (3)
all models include all block group and market-level control variables listed in Table 2.

Table 8
Predicted Percentage of ‘Yes” Votes in Block Groups
with High/Low Fraction of School-Age Children
% of Households with Children
Greater than 48%
High Income
Average Income
Low Income
High Fraction College
Average Fraction College
Low Fraction College
High Fraction White
Average Fraction White
Low Fraction White
High Income, College, White
Average Income, College, White
Low Income, College, White

Choice = 0
49.3%
28.3
14.8
45.2
30.6
21.5
57.8
34.2
14.7
54.5
31.4
13.2

Choice = 1
26.1%
29.1
32.1
24.1
28.4
31.8
23.9
27.8
32.7
21.4
27.9
35.4
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% of Households with Children Less
than 27.3%
Choice = 0
31.0%
30.4
29.8
35.3
30.5
27.2
46.6
28.9
14.5
45.3
29.9
16.9

Choice = 1
26.3%
26.2
26.1
23.4
27.2
30.4
23.4
26.7
30.8
21.8
27.6
33.9

The results of that exercise are reported in Table 7. 24 Columns 1 through 4 report results for the
sample that contains block groups with a high fraction of households with children, while columns 5
through 8 report results for the sample that contains block groups with a low fraction of households with
children. These results provide further evidence in favor of the hypothesis that capitalization effects
influence voting behavior. In particular, for the sample that contains block groups with a low fraction of
households with children, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between the sorting variables
and choice are negative and, for education and race, statistically significant. If there were no capitalization
effects at all, we would expect those coefficients to be zero.
To see the effects of sorting and choice more clearly, we again calculate the predicted percentage
of yes votes for block groups with high, average and low values of the sorting variables. These are
reported in Table 8. As the table reveals, households in the high-choice market look quite similar,
whether they have children or not, a result which is consistent with the hypothesis that households are
concerned about the impact of school vouchers on housing values. We also note that in the low-choice
market, where peer effects should dominate, high-SES households with children are much more
supportive of the voucher than high-SES households without children. This is what one would expect
since peer quality has a more direct impact on families with children.
VII.

Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided evidence on the gains and losses associated with a universal

school voucher. We find that in markets with relatively little Tiebout choice, high-income, highlyeducated and white households are more supportive of vouchers than low-income, less-educated and nonwhite households. These differences can be quite large and are larger for households with school-age
children. We interpret these differences as evidence that households are motivated by the changes in peer
quality that are likely to follow the implementation of a universal voucher. Our results support the
conclusions of Figlio and Stone (2001) that students from higher-income, more-educated and white
households are more likely to move to the private sector as public sector choice declines. Thus, our
results suggest that, in low choice markets, the introduction of universal vouchers may lead to more
racially and economically segregated schools as a disproportionate number of high-income, highlyeducated and white families opt out of the public sector.
We also find that in markets with a significant amount of choice, high-SES households are much
less supportive of school vouchers than low-SES households, a result consistent with voter concern over
the potential impact of vouchers on housing values. For high-SES households, the universal voucher
24

In the interest of brevity, we have once again suppressed the estimated coefficients for the market-level control
variables.
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presents the potential for large losses from lower housing values and these losses may offset any gains
from increased productivity or peer effects. While we find some evidence that these capitalization effects
exist, we also note that differences between high- and low-SES households in high-choice markets are
likely influenced by peer effects as well.
Regardless of the specific reasons for the differences in high-choice markets, our results provide
strong evidence of the effect that existing levels of Tiebout choice can have on support for universal
vouchers. In markets with little or no Tiebout choice, we predict 51.1 percent of high-SES households
support school vouchers. In contrast, in markets with significant Tiebout choice, only 22 percent of highSES households support school vouchers. It is particularly remarkable to see such low levels of support
among high-SES households anywhere in California given the dramatic changes in California’s system of
public school finance that have occurred over the last three decades. Specifically, in response to courtordered reforms and Proposition 13, California has transferred the responsibility for funding its schools
from local school districts to the state and equalized spending per pupil across districts. As documented
by Brunner and Sonstelie (2006), the transformation from local to state finance has led to a decline in
spending per pupil relative to the rest of the nation: between 1970 and 2000 spending per pupil in
California fell about 22 percent relative to spending per pupil in all other states. Student performance in
California has also declined relative to other states. One therefore might expect voters in California to be
relatively supportive of vouchers, particularly high-SES voters. In this context, the offsetting effect of
increased Tiebout choice is especially striking.
On a final note, our results also have important implications for policymakers looking for broadbased popular support for vouchers. Recall that Proposition 38 was an initiative to adopt a universal
voucher, available to all students. The gains and losses, and resulting voter support, could look quite
different if the voucher were instead targeted to either low-performing or low-income students. Such a
targeted voucher would clearly reduce the possibilities for cream-skimming, thereby reducing support
among high-SES households in low-choice areas but increasing support among low-SES households.
Thus, the specific design of a voucher proposal could have a significant impact on voter support.
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